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Provocation and Non-violent Homosexual Advances 
 
 
Sarah Oliver, LLB (Hons) Edin., Lecturer in Law, Dept. of Public Admin. and Law, Robert Gordon 
University 
 
 
 Some controversial areas of provocation have been developed to a significant 
extent in foreign jurisdictions before migrating to England and Scotland. The most 
obvious example is that of the ‘battered women defence’ which modifies a crucial 
aspect of the plea for the particular and unusual situation in hand. The same point can 
be said of the so-called ‘non-violent homosexual advance’ defence which has 
received a significant amount of coverage (most notably in Australia) but has yet to 
be discussed in any detail here. The particular aspect of provocation discussed here is 
the relevance of the proportionality requirement in cases of homosexual advance. 
 
 Given the lack of comment on this area in the U.K., it is helpful to outline 
some cases and terminology. In general, cases involve non-violent advances made by 
homosexual men. The kind of advance made differs widely but in all instances, the 
result has been to provoke a fatal attack, usually of a violent, if not frenzied kind. The 
accused is often described as having entered a state of mind labelled ‘homosexual 
panic’. Examples of the provocative act and response can be found across most 
jurisdictions. In the English case of R. v. Howard1, the deceased had enticed Howard 
back to his flat and grasped him by the testicles, prompting a fatal attack with a 
hammer. In a Scottish case, the deceased had put his hand on the accused’s thigh and 
asked for a kiss2. Examples from the Commonwealth include the Australian case of 
                                                          
1 7 Cr. App. R. (S) 130. 
2 Robertson v. H.M. Advocate 1994 JC 245 
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Green v. R3 where the deceased had slid into bed naked with the appellant and started 
touching his groin, whereupon the appellant attacked him with a pair of scissors. In 
New Zealand, the defence was allowed where the deceased had placed his hand on the 
accused’s thigh and smiled at him, triggering a flashback to childhood sexual abuse4. 
 
Contrasting approaches to the proportionality requirement 
 The classic doctrine of provocation requires that the response following the 
provocative act bears some proportionate relationship to the provocation, although 
exact equivalence is not required. This raises problems in relation to provocation by 
homosexual advance. As will be shown, it is in the nature of many cases that there 
will be no proportion between the provocative approach and the accused’s response. 
However, it is well-established in Scotland that proportionality is required no matter 
what the specific circumstances; “(t)here must be some equivalence between the 
mode of retaliation ... and the provocation given”5. It is stated that there is no need for 
the response to match the provocation exactly, for the simple reason that to exactly 
meet the fatal response given by the accused, the victim’s provocative conduct would 
have to show itself to be homicidal. If this were the case, the accused would be able to 
raise the plea of self-defence. In England, the ‘reasonable relationship rule’ used to 
apply in a similar fashion - “...fists might be answered with fists but not with a deadly 
weapon”6, but this has subsequently been overuled7. The question is one for the jury, 
and if they feel that the reasonable man would have responded as the accused did, 
then it does not matter that the response was disproportionately aggressive. 
                                                          
3 High Court of Australia, unreported - available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/unrep349.html 
4 R. v. Campbell [1997] 1 NZLR 16, available from Lexis. 
5 Gordon, Criminal Law, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son, 2nd edn., 1978, para. 25-19. 
6 Lord Devlin in R. v. Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932. 
7 For example, R. v. Brown [1972] 2 QB 229. 
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 Commonwealth 
 The contrast in approaches adopted by different jurisdictions can be illustrated 
through reported decisions. With regard to the Australian position, at least in relation 
to New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s23(3)), “...there is no rule of law that 
provocation is negatived if: (a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act 
or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or 
omission...”. This subsection seems to have been drafted as a means of avoiding 
problematic areas within the definition of provocation. It also goes on to remove the 
need for an immediate response, thereby opening the partial defence to battered 
women in cases of cumulative provocation, and it seems sensible, having admitted 
that there are aspects of the doctrine where the common law definition now sits ill, to 
specifically remove them.  
 
 The Australian approach is shown in Green v. R8 where the High Court found 
the accused’s conviction for murder to have been based on an incorrect application of 
the reasonable man test, thereby amounting to a miscarriage of justice. The facts of 
the case support the acceptance of the homosexual advance defence in that 
jurisdiction. Green had been drinking one night with the deceased who was some 
twenty years older than him, but whom he viewed as a long-standing and trusted 
friend. The deceased had made an advance which Green brushed off, saying that he 
was not interested. Green then went to bed but was followed by the deceased who 
came into his room naked, got into bed with him, grabbed hold of Green and touch his 
groin. Green responded by stabbing the deceased to death with a pair of scissors. The 
                                                          
8 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/unrep349.html 
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appeal was based on the accused’s increased sensitivity to unwanted sexual advances 
arising from his belief that his father had abused his sisters. This was rejected by the 
trial judge as too subjective a characteristic to impute to the reasonable man, but the 
High Court determined that it was relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the 
provocation, although not to the ordinary man’s response.  
 
 However, at no point did the court ever doubt that this situation amounted to 
provocation. This result could only be achieved by the removal of the proportionality 
requirement. Otherwise, Green’s fatal assault could only have been justified if the 
deceased had attacked him in a homicidal fashion, which was clearly not the case. If 
provocation as a concession to human frailty is to be extended to provide a partial 
excuse for heterosexual men faced with a homosexual advance, then the 
proportionality requirement must be removed. It could be argued that, in retaining the 
requirement that the accused’s response was in line with that of the ordinary man, a 
form of proportionality is still retained at an implicit level. The jury decide whether 
the accused has met the ordinary man test and, if the retaliation was wildly 
disproportionate to the provocation offered, it could be said that the jury would reject 
the plea. However, it is clear from the decided cases that Australian judges are 
prepared to accept that a frenzied and fatal response to a non-violent homosexual 
advance accords with what the ordinary man might do. However, the decision in 
Green was by majority. Kirby J., in dissent, stated that to allow a non-violent 
homosexual advance on its own to reduce murder to manslaughter excessively 
reduces the level of self-control expected by the criminal law. He also noted that 
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allowing this mitigation ran counter to current policy which sought to eradicate 
violent, irrational responses9. 
 
 The approach taken in New Zealand is similar. For example, in R. v. 
Campbell10 the appellant had been convicted of murder following a homosexual 
advance. The court heard of his childhood which had been characterised by serious 
and repeated sexual abuse. The deceased had placed his hand on Campbell’s thigh 
and smiled at him. Campbell suffered a flashback to the pain and anger which he had 
felt as a child. As a result, he attacked the deceased in a frenzied way, repeatedly 
striking him with an axe, thinking he was attacking his childhood abuser. At trial, the 
judge had referred to the issue of the proportionality requirement in ways which may 
have created the incorrect impression that it was a legal requirement. The conviction 
was quashed and a new trial ordered. It was held, inter alia, that proportionality 
should not be made into a legal requirement as it was no more than a significant factor 
which should be taken into account when deciding other questions of fact, presumably 
whether the ordinary man subjected to that level of provocation would have 
responded in that way. Thus, as in Australia, New Zealand courts will not insist on 
proportion between the provocation and the response, and can allow the plea in 
homosexual advance cases where, by their very nature, the response can be 
disproportionate. 
 
England 
 Likewise, in England, there is a general acceptance that the homosexual 
advance defence can be raised in cases of murder to reduce the charge. However, 
                                                          
9 ibid., p38. 
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there is no discussion of the defence itself in reported cases. In R. v. Cook11, the 
deceased had been in a pub and sent drinks over to Cook even though there had been 
no contact between them at that point. On his way home, Cook stopped to urinate and 
the deceased appeared behind him and indulged in what the case report describes as 
“...the most intimate homosexual activity” whereupon the appellant struck him to the 
ground and kicked him to death. His conviction for murder was replaced with one of 
manslaughter for other reasons, but again, this decision shows a willingness to 
consider the homosexual advance defence without insisting on proportionality in the 
response to the provocative conduct. Similarly, in R. v. Morley12 the deceased had 
approached Morley and asked him if he was gay, but when rebuffed, had followed the 
accused and grabbed his crotch. In sentencing him to four and a half years for 
manslaughter, the court again showed willing to allow the plea of provocation despite 
the lack of proportionality. 
 
Scotland 
 The problems raised by retaining the proportionality requirement are shown  
clearly in the Scottish case of Robertson v. H.M. Advocate13. Here the deceased had 
approached Robertson, placed a hand on his upper thigh and asked for a kiss. When 
rejected, the deceased produced a knife, repeated his request and then struck 
Robertson. At this point the accused turned round and punched and repeatedly 
stabbed the deceased. At trial, Robertson was convicted of murder following a 
direction to the jury that there had to be a reasonably proportionate relationship 
between the deceased’s conduct and the accused’s response. An appeal was taken on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 [1997] 1 NZLR 16 - available from Lexis. 
11 1982 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) - available from Lexis. 
12 (1993) 15 Cr. App. R.(S) 53. 
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the grounds that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by failing to tell them that 
only a gross disproportion or cruelly excessive response would bar the plea. The High 
Court of Justiciary rejected this and maintained that there must be a reasonably 
proportionate relationship between the provocation and the response. At the trial, it 
was felt, following Gordon’s Criminal Law, that it would take a “...tremendous 
amount of provocation  to palliate the stabbing of a man to death”14 and the jury 
clearly felt that the deceased had not provoked Robertson to that extent.  
 
 Since the deceased had presented a knife and struck the accused, arguably 
Robertson should have been allowed to plead provocation when he retaliated with 
blows and a knife. Thus it appears that, while Scottish courts are prepared to consider 
that a homosexual advance might amount to provocation, their insistence on 
proportionality effectively bars the plea. This approach is clearly contrary to that 
adopted elsewhere. In the other jurisdictions examined, Robertson would have been 
convicted of manslaughter (culpable homicide), on the basis that he responded as the 
reasonable man might have responded to a homosexual advance. Indeed, the advance 
made went beyond some of the foreign cases illustrated; it was not simply a minor 
homosexual advance, such as touching, but rather developed into a threatening 
situation when a knife was produced. Given this increase in the provocative nature of 
the conduct, and that Robertson responded with the same weapons, it seems rather 
harsh to have denied him the plea. 
 
Contrasting rationales 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 1994 JC 245. 
14 ibid., p246 citing Gordon, op. cit., p772. 
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 It is clear that there is a substantial difference between the Anglo-
Commonwealth and Scottish approaches. The question for each legal system must be 
whether, as a point of principle, they wish to allow for mitigation in these 
circumstances. The classic justification for the existence of the provocation plea is 
that it provides a concession to human frailty. The doctrine acknowledges that the 
perfectly rational human being is a myth and that, given sufficient pressure, it is to be 
expected that people will ‘snap’ and perhaps cause death as a result. The function of 
the plea is to recognise that these people have not killed intentionally or in cold blood, 
and therefore to mitigate the charge brought against them. To reject the relevance of 
proportionality in homosexual advance cases allows for more frequent use of the plea; 
once the jury are not required to find a reasonable relationship between the 
provocative conduct and the response, they are much more likely to say that the 
accused acted as any ordinary man in his position. It could be argued that this moves 
the plea of provocation away from its intended arena. To dispense with 
proportionality means that the plea is no longer merely open to those who are subject 
to unreasonable levels of provocation, ‘snap’ and respond in whatever way is 
necessary to stop the provocation. It is also open to those who do not restrict their 
response to that which is sufficient to stop the provocation, but go much further, often 
to the stage of a frenzied and fatal attack. Moreover, it could also be argued that the 
use of the plea to mitigate killing a homosexual man implicitly renders his life less 
important than that of a heterosexual man, all of which would suggest that Scots law 
takes the more acceptable line in maintaining the need for proportionality before the 
plea will be accepted. 
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 However, it is equally possible to construct arguments for the Anglo-
Commonwealth approach. If the point behind the plea of provocation is to excuse a 
fatal attack if sufficient provocation is found, then assessment of the level of 
provocation offered becomes crucial. In a non-sexual case, this is an easier 
assessment to make; if a man approached another man in a pub, directed abusive 
comments towards him and tried to push him out of the way, it would clearly be 
acceptable for that man to respond in a like manner. In the vast majority of instances, 
a proportionate response would be expected, and if the provoker had the misfortune to 
lose his footing and hit his head on the floor, no-one would expect the accused to be 
held responsible for murder. However, were that same man to respond by pulling out 
a knife and stabbing the provoker to death, it is entirely justifiable to deny him the 
plea of provocation because the intensity of his response is so disproportionate.  
 
 Cases involving homosexual advances fall into two groups. Firstly, there is the 
serious homosexual advance, in which case a fatal assault would be less 
disproportionate given the gravity of what had occurred. For example, in the 
Australian case of Green, Smart J. in the Court of Criminal Appeal described the 
actions of the deceased (getting into bed naked with the accused, grabbing him and 
touching his groin) as revolting and a “serious and gross violation of (his) body and 
(his) person”15. Secondly, and more often, there is a relatively trivial advance which 
still leads to the same fatal assault, thus resulting in a high level of disproportion. 
Why is provocation still allowed in these latter cases? The answer must be that, 
although, in minor cases, the conduct when viewed in the abstract is relatively 
innocuous, many men would react very badly to such an approach. If a group of men 
                                                          
15 Green, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/unrep349.html 
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were asked to assess how provocative they would find an objectively trivial approach, 
the answer would probably be extremely so. If a group of women were asked the 
same question, the answer would probably be entirely different. Culturally, especially 
in the more male-oriented societies, women are exposed to unwanted trivial sexual 
advances on a fairly frequent basis and usually attach little significance to them. Men 
are far less frequently exposed to trivial homosexual advances and therefore see them 
as much more significant and more of an infringement of their masculinity. Herein 
lies the reason for the acceptance of disproportionate provocation in homosexual 
advance cases. Cultural conditioning and differences in psychological characteristics 
across the genders mean that men are far more likely to react violently to relatively 
little homosexual provocation. If this is accepted as a common example of human 
frailty in men, then there is no reason why, in contradiction to the current Scottish 
approach, provocation should not be allowed. 
 
Conclusion 
 Arguably that the existence of the plea makes the homosexual community 
more vulnerable to attacks. This is true in relation to minor homosexual advances 
although it is upheld as a concession to human frailty, presumably in recognition of 
the fact that most men would view the advance as sufficiently provocative. However, 
in relation to serious advances, the crucial point is to assess the degree of provocation 
offered, regardless of the gender of the parties involved. If a man were to slip into bed 
and touch a woman in the way illustrated in Green v. R, then she should be able to 
plead provocation if she killed him because the level of conduct involved should be 
considered sufficient provocation. It should be irrelevant whether the perpetrator and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
at p5. 
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target are the same or the opposite sex. Thus the plea should apply equally to men 
who are approached uninvited by other men, or by women, and likewise to women 
who are approached by other men or women.  
 
 Thus the justifiable approach to these more serious cases is to allow the plea to 
anyone, regardless of gender, who has been approached sexually in a sufficiently 
provocative way. However, it should also be recognised that an approach which 
would not normally be sufficient could be made so by the use of a weapon. Although 
any serious and unwanted sexual advance should amount to provocation, it must be 
acknowledged that the reason why homosexual advances have received all the 
attention is that unwanted advances made towards women are far less likely to lead to 
a fatal assault, and it would be unusual for an advance on a man by a woman to reach 
a level that could be described as sufficient provocation. Nevertheless, in principle the 
plea should be open in any of these situations in recognition of the fact that conduct, 
especialy sexual conduct, can reach a level which is so extreme that human frailty 
should be recognised. 
 
